4 June 2026
In March 2026, the NGO Civil Liberties Union for Europe published its Rule of Law Report 2026, which is the seventh annual report on the state of the rule of law in the European Union (EU). The report serves as a comprehensive civil society “shadow report” to the Commission’s Rule of Law Report, that will appear later this year. Covering 22 EU Member States and developments within the EU institutions, the report assesses the four core pillars of the rule of law: justice systems, anti‑corruption, media freedom, and checks and balances. Its central finding is a widening implementation gap, showing that repeated Commission recommendations have failed to translate into concrete reforms at national level. This becomes evident in the 2025 cycle, where 93% of the recommendations were repetitions from previous years, none of them fully implemented, and many showing stagnation or even regression. Additionally, the report highlights backsliding in judicial independence, weak anti‑corruption enforcement, growing threats to media freedom, shrinking space for civil society, and emerging rule-of-law concerns within EU institutions themselves. Overall, it warns that reporting alone is not enough, and that without stronger action by the Commission, rule of law issues within the Union are likely to persist.
2. The EU is suspending the transfer of funds to Serbia due to rule of law concerns
The EU Enlargement Commissioner, Marta Kos, communicated that the European Commission has suspended its financial support to Serbia, as the result of a long-standing dissatisfaction with the country’s situation. As an EU candidate country since 2012, Serbia has been eligible for EU funding intended to support domestic reforms necessary for eventual accession. Including, the EU Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which allocates €6 billion for the 2024–2027 period. Particular concerns have been raised regarding recent judicial amendments adopted without adequate consultation, which weaken judicial independence by expending the powers of court presidents and removing safeguards guaranteeing prosecutor’s independence. These concerns were confirmed by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe in its urgent opinion on the matter. According to Commissioner Kos, financial support will not resume until these issues are addressed. Moreover, Serbia’s path towards the EU has slowed down due to its close ties to Russia and its stance on Ukraine. Alignment with EU foreign policy is considered a fundamental requirement for accession and the Commission hereby clarifies that candidate countries cannot “sit on two chairs”.
3. Hungary votes out Orban
Hungarian voters have ended Viktor Orbán’s 16-year term in a historic election, with the opposition Tisza party led by Péter Magyar winning a two-third supermajority in parliament. Magyar’s campaign was essentially focused on the corruption within the Orbán government and Hungary’s poor economic performance in recent years. Following the announcement of the results, Orbán conceded defeat and accepted the outcome, stating that his party would continue to serve in the opposition. The scale of the victory would allow the new government the possibility to amend the constitution and to reverse some key pillars of Orbán’s illiberal system. In particular, institutional reforms strengthening judicial independence and the rule of law would be necessary to unlock the more than €16 billion in EU funds that remain frozen. At the EU level, the victory could reduce delays and obstruction on certain files, such as support for Ukraine. More broadly, the election may mark a turning point for the EU itself: European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has stated that this political “momentum” should be used to revisit the Union’s decision‑making rules, particularly by moving towards qualified majority voting in foreign policy.
4. Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index published
On the 30th of April, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) published its annual 2026 World Press Freedom Index, which finds that the press freedom worldwide is at its lowest level since the Index was launched 25 years ago. For the first time in the history of the report, a majority of countries are now rated as having a “difficult” or “very serious” situation of press freedom. The report assesses five dimensions of press freedom, namely the economic, legal, security, political and social environments for journalism. Out of these five categories, the legal dimension experienced the sharpest decline in 2026, reflecting the growing use of legal tools to restrict press activity, including the abuse of lawsuits and national security laws. The report specifically highlights a deterioration of press freedom in the Americas, with the United States falling seven places, in the context of policies introduced under the Trump administration. In this overall negative context, the Netherlands rose to second place of the list this year, ranking behind Norway.
Does prohibiting the dispersal of LGBTQI+ material and information to children violate Article 2 TEU?
In 2021, Hungary introduced Law No LXXIX which prohibits children from accessing content displaying homosexuality and different gender identities, under the auspices of protecting children. Upon the basis of this law, Hungary amended several legislative acts, thereby limiting the dispersal of information on gender reassignment and homosexuality, including through advertising. On 19th December 2022, the European Commission brought an action for failure to fulfil obligations relating to freedom of services on the internal market, the CFREU and the GDPR.
In its judgment of 21 April 2026, the CJEU, sitting as a full court, found a breach of the freedom to provide and receive services; a breach of the right to human dignity (Article 1 of the Charter) and infringement of Article 2 TEU due to coordinated discriminatory measures. It found that the Hungarian law is at odds with the common EU legal order grounded in pluralism.
This is the first time an infringement of Article 2 has been found as a standalone ground. The magnitude of the issue is emphasised by European Law Blog who note that there was an unprecedented number of Member States joining this case against another country’s national laws. Additionally, its enormity is emphasised by the fact that the Court sat in complete formation. The case fits within a trend of rule of law violating rules by Hungary (firstly targeting “enemies” of the state and secondly deficiency in transparency and sincere consultation).
Is the irregular appointment of a judge sufficient to entail a breach of the requirement that the deciding body is “a tribunal previously established by law”?
This judgment of the Grand Chamber concerns the validity of national legislation and case-law prohibiting national courts from questioning and scrutinising whether constitutional courts and bodies are legitimate, including with regard to the legitimacy of judicial appointments.
The request for a preliminary ruling by Poland concerns the meaning of Article 2, Article 6(1-3) and Article 19(1) TEU read in light of Article 47 CFREU. It arose from proceedings relating to a contract between two traders. During these proceedings, the defendant sought the recusal of the judge hearing the case, on the basis that this judge was not validly appointed. The judge had been appointed by the KRS, a body responsible for safeguarding the independence of the judiciary. However, the KRS themselves had been elected by the Lower Chamber and not by judges, meaning they failed to provide guarantees of independence as necessitated by EU law. Further, the referring court noted that appeals against appointments by the KRS are overseen by the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs- a body appointed by the KRS. This gives rise to further concerns regarding the existence of an effective remedy.
The referring court thus questioned (paraphrased):
In answer to the first question, the Court began by referring to Commission v Poland (2023) where it was held that Poland had failed to comply with Article 19(1) due to its law precluding national courts from ascertaining whether judges met independence requirements to satisfy standards required by EU law. The Court further opined that where Article 19(1) has provably been infringed, national courts must apply EU law and in doing so it is not necessary to request or await the setting aside of contradictory provisions by legislative means. The Polish court must therefore disregard the judgment of the Constitutional Court which prohibits the review of the lawfulness of the appointment of judges.
However, in answer to the second question, the Court went on to reflect that “irregular appointments to judicial posts are systemic in Poland”, more than 3000 judges have been appointed irregularly: 30% of the judges in sitting. Due to the fact that this is a systemic problem, the court finds that a case-by-case assessment of compliance with being a “tribunal previously established by law” in procedures for recusal on the basis of how judges were appointed does not suffice to ensure full compliance with Article 19(1) TEU. This is furthered by the fact that systemic non-independence also effects preliminary rulings and thereby the functioning of the EU legal system. The national legal order must create a framework that enables an assessment of the possibilities of persons judicially appointed to be assessed for whether they can continue to perform their duties, though there is no one way to do this.
However- and perhaps in light of the scale of the problem- the Court proceeded to find that there is not an automatic vitiation of the appointment required on the grounds of irregular appointment but instead it is necessary for the national court to be able to ascertain whether the judge meets the requirement of a “tribunal previously established by law”, and if not, to recuse the judge. The substantive conditions governing the adoption of decisions to appoint judges must not give rise to reasonable doubt as to the imperviousness of the judges concerned to external factors and as to their neutrality with respect to the interests before them in order to satisfy the criteria of being a tribunal established by law. Importantly though, the Court found that not every error made during the appointment procedure will give rise to doubts about independence and impartiality. Several factors are at play in a decision that there is a breach of the requirement of a tribunal previously established by law. The absence of an appeal in itself against the appointment of SC to the judicial post does not lead alone to the finding that she should be recused. Verfassungsblog notes that this creates discordance between the approach of the ECHR and the CJEU on the issue of irregular appointment of Polish judges.
When can the CJEU question the decision to waiver immunity of a European Parliamentarian?
This judgment of the Third Chamber of the Court concerns the decision to waive parliamentary immunity for a Member of Parliament in Spain. This judgment rendered on 5 February 2026 pertains to the appeal brought against the initial judgment dismissing the complaint.
In 2017, the Catalan independence referendum occurred. In the aftermath, the Spanish Supreme Court sought to prosecute the former Catalan president for misusing public funds and insurgency. However, this conflicted with Mr Puigdemont i Casamajó’s parliamentary immunity owing from his outstanding position as both a member of the Spanish Supreme Court and the European Parliament. The Supreme Court requested that this immunity was waivered and this was upheld.
In this appeal, the appellants requested the judgment to be set aside, in part due to the fact that the General Court erred in law for finding that the General Court did not have the competency to review the legality of the request for waiver of immunity. The initial judgment found that no merit to the argument that there was a lack of impartiality on the part of the rapporteur responsible for examining the requests for waiver of immunity. This was challenged in the appeal.
In its findings, the Court noted first that MPs are to enjoy the privileges of immunity as far as necessary to perform its tasks, to enable effective protection against hindrances to functioning and independence for the parliament, in accordance with the principle of separation of powers. Further, the decision by which the parliament decides to waiver immunity is not political, as the General Court wrongly found, but legal. Stemming from this observation, the Parliament must comply with the legal rules in relation to the waiver of immunity including the Charter.
Further, the Court found that the requirement of impartiality for the rapporteur entails that “a Member must not be able to entertain legitimate doubts as to the fact that the rapporteur who is called upon to examine that request is not guided by considerations which would prevent him or her from carrying out objectively his or her duties”. The Court did not accept the Parliament’s contention that links between members of parliament which form political groups within the EP are not sufficiently close to affect the impartiality of the rapporteur to examine a member of that group. Therefore, there was an error in law by the General Court in holding that the fact that the rapporteur belonged to the same political group as that which brought the criminal proceedings against the individual had no bearing on the partiality of the rapporteur.
As to the second complaint, the legal classification of the facts was incorrect as the General Court did not take in to account relevant facts in the chronology of the background to the dispute. Thereby, the court did not consider that these facts make the person appointed rapporteur unfit for appointment, due to their weight in indicating support for criminal prosecution of the applicants.
As DCU note, the judgment raises fundamental questions about the right to a fair trial within EU institutions and the adequacy of the procedure at EP Level for waiving immunity.
The handling of retroactive national judgments by the EU Court.
The case concerned the appeal against the judgment of the General Court which dismissed the applicant’s action for annulment against a decision of the European Commission. The decision of the Commission related to the recovery of certain sums paid in connection with allowances for his mother and three dependent children as governed by the EU Staff Regulation. A point of issue in the case before the General Court was a national judgment which terminated the foster placement for two of the applicant’s children.
The decision by the national court had since been annulled upon appeal (and as such had never taken place), but the General Court had not taken that into consideration. The Commission argued that the General Court was obliged to look at the facts and law as they stood at the time when the measure (revocation of funds) was adopted. However, the Court held that the retroactive effect of the judgment of the appellate court could not be disregarded. To do so would lead to the distortion of the legal position of those involved. The judgment offers valuable guidance on the subject of retroactive judgments at national level and their handling by the CJEU.
Can binding standards be enforced despite not being published in the Official Journal of the European Union?
This preliminary ruling is derived from proceedings in the Netherlands regarding EU rules regulating tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide emissions from cigarettes. These quantities are regulated by EU law, which refers to ISO standards to measure these emissions levels. It is the nature and adequacy of these measuring techniques which the Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority took issue with. The fact that these ISO standards were not published in the Official Journal of the European Union led to uncertainty as to their enforceability.
The (relevant) question therefore turned on when ISO standards can be enforced considering that they have not been published in the Official Journal of the European Union and are not accessible to the general public. Additionally, clarity was requested regarding what obligations ensue from the principles of legal certainty and legal precision.
The Grand Chamber, sitting on 21st April 2026, found that despite not being published, the fact that the Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority had accessed the ISO standards meant it still applied to them. Furthermore, it found that there is an overriding public interest in disclosing the standards in the context of a request for access to documents, even where these standards are protected by intellectual property rights. In such a case, the public interest prevails. This public interest is derived from the principle of the rule of law (Article 2 TEU) and enshrined in Article 42 CFREU. The costs are to be borne by the EU in making these standards accessible.
To what extent can the right to a fair trial vitiate the obligation to execute a confiscation order?
This case concerns the extent to which freezing orders and confiscation orders must be mutually recognised, in light of Article 47 CFREU (the right to an effective remedy).
The case from which this preliminary ruling is derived concerns a company who wished to challenge the confiscation order issued by Slovenia to the Croatian authorities. Several defects in the legal procedures had occurred in the course of their criminal trial, including the failure to provide the full text of the judgment to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was not summoned to partake in all stages of the criminal proceedings and that they were not advised of the right to access a lawyer. Thus, the Croatian court questioned whether Article 47 of the Charter is capable of precluding the recognition and execution of the confiscation order.
The Court found that a Member State cannot refuse to recognise and execute a confiscation order on the ground that the issuing Member State allegedly failed to respect the fundamental rights, where that Member State did in fact serve a sufficient part of the judgment to the person but this person did not make use of the legal remedies available. This finding makes clear that, though fundamental rights infringements can vitiate the mutual recognition of a freezing order, this will not always be the case and indeed requires a substantial and manifest breach of such a right.
Can refusal to renew a radio station’s broadcasting rights violate Article 11?
The European Commission brought a case against Hungary for failure to fulfil obligations in relation to competition in the network communications and services sector and Article 11 of the CFREU (freedom of expression and information). This case was brought pursuant to Hungary’s adoption of a decision in which a company’s right to use the radio spectrum was ended. Hungary rebutted the Commission’s claims with the argument that the Commission does not have competency in areas relating to the design of a Member State’s media system and further, that, given this prior contention, the Charter is not applicable as this is not a matter of EU law.
The Court found that Hungary failed to fulfil its obligations due to its refusal to renew Klubrádió’s radio broadcasting rights. The Court firstly found that national measures fall within the scope of the EU regulatory framework and, as such, the Charter is invoked. The Hungarian rule requiring the media council to automatically refuse to renew the right to provide media services where there has been a repeat infringement, without any appreciation of whether a balance has been struck between the seriousness of the infringement and the consequences of refusal to renew the rights was deemed disproportionate. (In this case, the infringement in question concerned the failure to submit data in relation to quotas). Further, the length of which the refusal decision was issued violated the principle of good administration. In addition, the inability to rectify the application was found disproportionate.
Regarding the alleged Article 11 infringement, the Court noted that “freedom of the media associated with freedom of broadcasting includes not only the right to impart information, but also, and inseparably, the right to use any appropriate means to disseminate information and transmit it to the widest possible audience”. Radio, by its capability to shape public opinion, can be considered a “fundamental channel” by which Article 11 rights manifest. The Court recalled that Article 11 expresses one of the values on which the EU is founded under Article 2 TEU and interferences cannot exceed what is strictly necessary. The inability for the Media Council to assess the severity of infringements when reviewing applications for renewal risks a system of decision making which repeatedly infringes on Article 11. The Court therefore decreed that the complaints as to Article 11 were well founded in relation to both the adoption of the refusal decision and the subsequent unreviewable invalidity finding.
Whether the lifting of a judge’s immunity can violate the right to a fair trial.
Between 2017 and 2020 the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court of Poland lifted a judge’s immunity from being prosecuted and suspended her from acting as a judge. This suspension was likely in connection to her public condemnation of judicial reforms, in addition to her involvement in a case brought against the Minister of Justice, which was successful. Ms Moraweic had been highly vocal about the government’s reforms of the Polish judiciary.
Having unsuccessfully appealed the lifting of her immunity, the judge brought this case before the ECtHR claiming that the Disciplinary Chamber did not amount to an “independent and impartial tribunal” under Article 6(1) and Article 8 ECHR and further that the Disciplinary Court had violated her right to free expression by taking such measures in response to her public criticism and challenge of the government’s judicial reforms.
The Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1, much as it had in other cases relating to this court. It also found a violation of Article 8 and Article 10. Lifting the judge’s immunity from prosecution was deemed to create a “chilling effect” which served to discourage not only Ms Morawiec but also judges more broadly from commenting on Polish judicial reforms or independence concerns. There was, as far as the Court was concerned, prima facie evidence of a causal connection between Ms Morawiec’s criticisms of the judiciary and the decision to lift her immunity from prosecution and suspend her.
Was the detention of Aleksey Nevalnyy in 2021 lawful?
This case concerns the 2021 arrest and detention of prominent political activist and opponent to the Russian regime, Aleksey Navalnyy. Mr Navalnyy was convicted of fraud and money laundering in 2014, leading to a suspended sentence of 3.5 years. In 2020, Mr Navalnyy was poisoned with Novichok nerve agent. In 2021, he returned from Berlin to Russia, leading to his immediate arrest and a behind-closed-doors hearing resulting in his detention. In 2024, Mr Navalnyy died in a high-security prison in the Russian Arctic. This case arises from Mr Navalnyy’s complaint under Article 5(1) that his detention in 2021 following the activation of the suspended sentence levelled against him in 2014 was unlawful. The flawed nature of this initial sentence had already been established in Navalnyye v. Russia (2017) due to the arbitrariness of the conviction, which reached the threshold of denial of justice. In the present case, the Court therefore found that the 2021 imprisonment was not lawful and violated Article 5(1). Further, the Court found that the detention had been based on provisions which were not applicable to Mr Navalnyy’s situation, violating the principles of legal certainty and foreseeability.
As pertains to the Article 2 complaint, the Court found that the failure to conduct a sufficient investigation in to the 2020 poisoning incident was an adverse inference of importance. Further, the Court was convinced that Mr Navalnyy had substantiated his claim that detention would put his life at risk and this warranted national courts to have addressed the source of the risk, how immediate it is and alternative arrangements. By dismissing Mr Navalnyy’s arguments and disregarding the ECtHR’s former judgment and interim measures imposed, they failed in their positive duty to protect him, leading to a violation of Article 2.
As to Article 3, the Court found that the applicant had been subjected to 39 days of sleep deprivation arbitrarily and had shaved off his hair. His health, well-being and dignity had been disregarded, and the combination of these aspects of his treatment led to a violation of Article 3.
