3 June 2026
EU Policy Updates:
Safe Countries of Origin:
In February, both the Parliament and the Council adopted changes to the EU asylum procedure regulation to establish a list of safe countries of origin and rules on the application of the safe country of origin concept.
The list of safe countries of origin designates certain countries of origin such as Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Morocco (non-exhaustive) and EU accession countries generally, as countries where no persecution or real risk of serious harm is present. The application of the concept of safe countries of origin will enable Member States to consider an asylum application as inadmissible where applicants could receive effective protection in one such country. There is increased discretion for Member States when determining an applicable safe country : there need not be any connection between the applicant and the safe country. Connection between the country and applicant, the transit by the applicant through the country or an agreement between the Member State and relevant country may be taken into account.
Return Regulation:
In March, the European Parliament voted to proceed with the first round of negotiation with the Council of Ministers on the proposed Return Regulation. For a brief commentary on the position of the Council, see the earlier Meijers Committee update here.
The amended text voted on by the European Parliament featured notable derogations from procedure in cases of third country nationals who pose security risks.
In accordance with Article 16, such individuals, among several grounds, may have committed a criminal offence punishable by a sentence of “at least two years” under national law. The provision also leaves open the possibility for Member States to identifications that the individuals pose a security threat identified under national law. Persons falling within Article 16 may be made subject to removal, an indefinite entry ban and detention in prisons “where possible” separated from other prisoners.
It also placed the burden of proof for demonstrating risk of a breach of non-refoulement on the third-country national. Speaking of general procedural safeguards, including informing individuals involved in return procedures, the EP’s amendments relied heavily on the use of machine translation and communication that adults/minors could be “reasonably […] presumed to understand”.
Negotiations have since quickly proceeded between the relevant institutions with apparently the only point of contention being the date of application of the new Regulation.
For further analysis of the progress of the proposed Return Regulation, please refer to the Meijers Committee’s earlier comments here and here.
Council of Europe Drafting Group on the Safe Third Country Concept:
The Council of Europe is in the midst of revising Recommendation No. R(97)22 on the application of the safe third country concept in the field of human rights and international protection. The Steering Committee for Human Rights has established a Drafting Group on the Safe Third Country Concept who had their 4th meeting recently in late March. The Group reviewed the current draft of the text and written feedback received.
The amended draft text of the study includes strong reference to the Court’s case law on the principle of non-refoulement, with a particular emphasis on the procedural obligations under Article 3 ECHR. The working group also saw fit to recall that EU Member States which are also a party to the Convention are bound by its provisions even when applying[JM2] EU law or bilateral agreements, presumably drawing attention to upcoming return agreements under the proposed Return Regulation. Along this line, the report pays particular attention to the interplay with ongoing EU legislative developments. In reference to the amended Asylum Procedures Regulation and the safe third country concept under EU Law (discussed above), the report notes that the Convention does not preclude the designation of safe third countries, but such a presumption must be supported by an analysis of conditions and asylum system in such countries.
The study further outlines the novel geopolitical and different hybrid contexts arising in migration and asylum law, which constitute a particular reason to revise the former Recommendation. The study refers to hybrid threats undermining the protection of national security and raises the interesting point as to how to ensure countries instrumentalising migration flows cannot be simultaneously designated safe third countries.
The study also considers that the definition of the concept of a “safe third country” may benefit from further explanation as opposed to the broad and abstract reference in the original Recommendation. It states that a more detailed definition could reflect case law and ensure the practical applicability of the text by States.
Written feedback received from certain Member States, required a more-balanced opinion by the CDDH on the necessity of an updated Recommendation. Extensive feedback was provided on the language of the text and the accurate and thorough inclusion of contributions by civil society actors such as Amnesty International, officials of the Commission, and expert academics such as Professor Daniel Thym and Professor Vincent Chetail.
Calls to ensure enforcement of New Pact on Migration and Asylum in the Tweede Kamer
On the 23rd March, Member van der Plas tabled a motion on the implementation of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. Van der Plas raised concerns that the former EU legislation on asylum had been severely undermined by the structural non-compliance by other Member States with their respective obligations. She noted that the current Pact similarly lacks enforcement measures and sanctions in the event of failure to meet responsibilities. This led to a call on the government to adopt an action plan to respond to non-compliance with the Pact by other Member States, ultimately leading to the Netherlands being relieved of its “unconditional” implementation of the Pact[JM3] .
In spite of these reservations, the Tweede Kamer has since approved the New Pact on Migration and Asylum on the 2nd April.
Full Entry into force of the Entry/Exit System:
The new Entry/Exit System became fully operational on the 10th April 2026, following its progressive implementation since the 12th October 2025. The Commission reported the refusal of entry of over 27, 000 people in its first stages of roll-out, noting that the system helped to identify approximately 700 people posing a security risk to Europe.
EES has been fully implemented in the Netherlands, with the Autoriteit Persoongegevens (‘the AP’) providing information on their website as to which national authorities have access (under varying conditions) to EES: Customs; Royal Netherlands Marechausee; Sea Ports Policy; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Immigration and Naturalisation Service; Police; Special Investigative Services and exceptionally, Europol. The AP is also responsible for the supervision of processing of personal data by Dutch Authrorities, working in conjunction with the European Data Protection Supervisor.
CJEU cases:
Case C-819/25 PPU Gonrieh
The issue before the Court concerned a family and their family reunification in Belgium. X, the father, held a visa for residence in Belgium whilst his wife and children remained within the Gaza strip in Palestine. The issue which arose concerned the inability of X’s family to reach the embassy in Egypt to receive their family reunification visas.
The questions referred to the Court related to the existence of an obligation for Member States to provide assistance enabling third country national to reach the country where the visa could be acquired under Directive 2003/86.
Relying on contextual and historical interpretation, the Court found that Art 13 (1) Directive 2003/86 requires Member States to remove any administrative obstacles in the process of issuing visas but by contrast, it does not impose any obligation in diplomatic or consular relations between a Member State and a third country. As such an obligation to enable the family’s evacuation to a third country cannot be understood from this provision.
Case C-718/24 Aleb
The case concerned the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU on the granting and withdrawal of international protection, whereby an unaccompanied minor had travelled through a ‘safe third country’ prior to the submission of an application in a Member State.
In relation to Article 38 (2) (a) of the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Court was asked to clarify whether the Member State must make provision in their national law for criteria in assessing a “connection” between the applicant for asylum and a safe third country concerned. The Court held that in light of the requirement for Member States to lay down the condition of a “connection” in national law, they must also determine the relevant criteria for the purpose of assessing that condition. The criteria should specify that the connection must be sufficient to make the applicant’s movement to that country reasonable.
As to the methodology which should be utilised in designating safe third countries, the Court emphasised the possibility for Member States to choose between different methods to apply the safe third country concept. It recalled its earlier jurisprudence which enabled Member States to designate safe third countries on the basis of an act of general application or on a ‘case-by-case’ basis. In accordance with the Directive, an individual examination of whether a country is “safe” for an individual and the ability for the applicant to challenge the existence of a connection to that third country must be preserved.
Case C-632/24 Lenaimon
The preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation of Article 30.6 of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the EU and its Member States, which lists the nationalities which must possess visas when crossing external borders.
The applicant M.P, holds Canadian, Russian and Israeli nationality and was not required to hold a visa in order to enter the territory of Lithuania. However, his application for temporary residence was rejected due to the fact that he held Russian nationality and had not satisfied the requirements for application on the basis of that nationality. By virtue of a clause precluding its direct effect, Article 30.6 cannot be invoked directly before a national court, but the Court recalled that the national court must still interpret the applicable provision of national law consistently with the international agreement.
In the alternative, the Court answered a question on the requirements for temporary residence according to Regulation 2018/1806 which lists the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders (‘Visa Code’). The national court raised similar questions as to the issue of dual nationality. The Court answered in brief, stating that the Visa Code did not grant a temporary right of residence, and the facts of the case did not imply that the right to short stay as provided under the Schengen Border Code was at issue. Hence, it deemed that a national law which requires a Russian national to provide additional residence documents for the purpose of temporary residence in that Member State is not precluded by the Visa Code.
Case C-489/24 Safita
The questions referred to the Court concerned Directive 2013/32/EU (‘Asylum Procedure Directive’) and the failure to take a decision on the application for a temporary asylum residence permit within the statutory six-month time limit.
The question was raised under Article 31 (3) of the Directive on time limits in conjunction with Article 4 (1) which ensures that competent authorities have adequate means to carry out tasks under the Directive. Article 31 (3) Asylum Procedures Directive allows Member States to extend the period for consideration where a large number of applicants makes it difficult to conclude the decision-making within that period. There are three conditions for the application of this extension: applications must be lodged simultaneously, by a large number of third country nationals/stateless persons and it must be ‘very difficult’ in practice to conclude the procedure within 6 months.
The Court held that the Directive does not prevent multiple or consecutive extensions insofar as the three cumulative conditions are satisfied, provided that the examination procedure is completed within 21 months of application. Hence, the onus lies with the Member State to demonstrate that despite its efforts to mitigate the simultaneous inflow of applications, it did not have sufficient time to fulfil its obligations to provide the determining authority with the appropriate means to complete their tasks.
Case C-477/24 Deldwyn
The issue before the Court concerned the interpretation of Art 7 (3) (b) of Directive 2004/38 (‘the Citizens Rights Directive’). A third country national had acquired a derived right of residence under the Citizens Rights Directive through his spouse, who was residing in Ireland although not holding that nationality. Subsequent to their divorce, the applicant’s request for the retention of his residence was denied, on grounds that he could not prove that his former spouse had a valid right of residence at the time of their divorce.
The Court found that the expression pertaining to employment or self- employment “for more than one year” contained in Art 7 (3) (b) Citizen Rights Directive, must be interpreted as referring to a continuous period of employment/self-employment. As to the meaning of ‘duly recorded’ involuntary unemployment within that same provision, the Court was asked to rule on whether the receipt of unemployment allowance would constitute such a record. The Court explained that whether the receipt of allowances can be considered as “duly recorded” involuntary unemployment depends on the conditions for granting this allowance in the Member State. It was therefore left to the national court to assess whether the Irish allowance was conditional on involuntary unemployment.
As to the provision by the Member States of files/documents to applicants for residence, the Court first noted that individuals cannot directly rely on Art 41 the Charter as it refers exclusively to the principle of good administration for EU institutions.
Case C-458/24 Daraa
The preliminary reference put before the Court concerned Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (‘Dublin III Regulation’) and Directive 2013/32/EU (‘Asylum Procedures Directive’), following the rejection of a Syrian national’s application for asylum in Germany and the ordering of his removal to Italy.
On the basis of information contained in the Eurodac database, Italy was designated as the Member State responsible for examining the application, hence the German authority deemed the application for asylum inapplicable and ordered the removal of the individual to Italy. However, Italy had communicated at the time of application that it had suspended the transfer of persons to its territory for assessment, in absence of systemic flaws in the Member States which result in a risk of violation of Article 4 Charter (inhuman or degrading treatment).
The Court held that that unilateral suspension of transfers by a Member States in situations not falling within Article 3 (2) Dublin III Regulation (systemic flaws) cannot lead to the transfer of responsibility to another Member State. It stressed that derogation by way of “mere unilateral announcement” would undermine the functioning of the asylum system, shift responsibilities and encourage applicants to continue their migratory journey to another Member State with more favourable conditions.
The Court added that generally where transfer does not take place between the requesting and the responsible State within the 6 months laid down in Article 29 (1) Dublin III Regulation, the requesting State will become responsible for the consideration of the application. Acknowledging that the rule ensures the individual involved effective access to the asylum procedure (among other considerations), the Court held that in situations of unilateral refusal, the requesting State (Germany) would still become responsible for the application after the time period expired. It recalled that a Member State cannot rely on the failure of other Member States to perform their obligations, to justify their own failures.
Case C-446/2024 Freie Hansestadt Bremen
The preliminary questions referred pertained to Directive 2008/115/EC (‘the Return Directive’) after the removal of a Russian National from Germany due to a risk that he would conduct a terrorist attack on its territory. The issue in the case pertained to the adoption by the German authorities of an indefinite entry ban against the individual.
The Court noted that Article 11 (2) of the Return Directive provided for entry bans which exceed five years in the case of a serious threat to public policy, public security or national security which may in principle include indefinite periods. The Member States, however, remain obliged to pay due regard to all relevant circumstances of the case in question, including their obligation to consider withdrawing or suspending such a ban. It accepted that the national law allowed for consideration of individual circumstances in each case, even if the rules for entry periods are standardised, including exceptions and the possibility for subsequent withdrawal or suspension of the ban.
Case C-150/24 Aroja
The request for a preliminary ruling pertained to Directive 2008/115/EC (‘Asylum Procedures Directive’) and arose from a case about the multiple detentions of a third country national by Finnish authorities for the purpose of his removal to his country of origin.
The Court ruled that Article 15 of the Directive requires the periods of detention to be aggregated when assessing whether the maximum period of detention has been reached, with reference to the right to liberty enshrined in Article 6 of the Charter. It added that account must also be take of the period of detention elapsed during the procedure for judicial review of the lawfulness of the removal decision. The emergence of new factual and legal circumstances during the process of re-detention relating to ‘one and the same return decision’ does not restart the relevant period of detention.
In relation to the second set of questions referred by the national court, the Court further held that judicial review of the exceedance of the maximum period of detention cannot be made contingent on an application by the detained person. As to when such review must take place, the Court noted in the absence of EU law determining when judicial review of the extension of detention must take place, the Member States (in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness) are not obliged to provide judicial review before the period of maximum detention is reached. However, it added that the review of extension must take place no later than judicial review of detention ordered by an administrative authority under Article 15 (2) Directive, in accordance with the principle of equivalence. Hence, it must take place “as soon as possible” after the adoption of the decision to extend.
In the absence of judicial review in good time of the extension of detention beyond the maximum period of 6 months, the Court held that on this ground alone, the immediate release of the person cannot be mandated. This finding is applicable where upon judicial review, the substantive conditions justifying continued detention are satisfied and the maximum period for detention under Article 15 (6) Directive has not been reached.
ECtHR Cases:
H.D. v. Italy (application no. 41645/23)
The case concerned the detention of an unaccompanied minor migrant in an adult reception centre in Italy and the alleged violation of Article 3; 13 and 5 of the Convention. The Italian Government did not contest the deprivation of liberty but asserted that it was lawful in accordance with Art 5 (1) (f) which relates to detention to prevent an unauthorised entry. The Court did not accept this contention and correspondingly found a violation of Articles 5 (1) and (2) ECHR, due to the lack a clear and accessible legal basis for detention. The Court further found a violation of Article 5 (4), due to the inability of the applicant to challenge the lawfulness of his deprivation of liberty. This finding arose from the 4 months which elapsed before a hearing was held after the filing of an urgent application and the national court’s striking out of the application due to the applicant’s release during that period.
In relation to the alleged violation of Art 3 ECHR in conjunction with Article 13 ECHR, the Court found that in the absence of preventative measures and a means of bringing the alleged violation to an end (transfer to a facility for minors), there was a breach of Article 13 ECHR.
Due to the absence of separation between minors and adults, in addition to the lack of resources tailored to the needs of unaccompanied minors, and generally inadequate conditions, the Court further found a violation of Art 3 ECHR.
V.N. and Others v. Sweden (no. 42101/23)
The case before the Court concerned an alleged violation of Article 8 of the ECHR, by reason of the separation of spouses during the serious illness of the wife (second applicant) due to the rejection of the asylum application and issuance of a deportation order against the husband (first applicant).
Three applicants, parents and child, were denied asylum protection on first application to the Swedish Migration agency. The second applicant was granted temporary protection after her diagnosis with cervical cancer. The first applicant, her husband, however, was identified as a threat to public order and security in Sweden, considered to outweigh his right to respect for his private and family life.
The Court found that the member state had not overstepped its boundaries of margin appreciation, in the balancing of the competing interests. Accordingly, no violation of Article 8 of the Convention was found.
M.V et autres c Belgique (no. 52836/22 et 3 autres)
The case concerned four asylum seekers who were deprived of accommodation and material support for extended periods, despite applying for international protection. The Court found violation of Article 3 ECHR noting the applicants’ time spent living on the street with no resources, no access to facilities and in constant fear. The Court classified the treatment as ‘degrading” due to the lack of respect for their human dignity.
Moreover, the Court found a violation of Article 6 ECHR due to the extended delay in the enforcement of the Employment tribunal’s decisions providing for accommodation and material support.
Finally, the Court found a violation of Article 34 of the Convention, due the Belgian State’s failure to take all reasonable steps to comply with the interim measures as quickly as possible.
D.M. v. Sweden (no. 32694/23)
The case concerned the alleged violation of Article 3 ECHR should the applicant be removed to Afghanistan. The Court did not consider the general security situation or widespread human rights violations in Afghanistan sufficient for the finding of a breach of Article 3 ECHR. It considered the situation in conjunction with the applicant’s Hazara ethnicity, his perception as a convert or apostate and his “westernisation”. It considered that the applicant had adapted to a Western way of life due to his ten years spent in Sweden. Taking the factors cumulatively, the Court considered that Article 3 ECHR would be violated should the applicant be returned to Afghanistan.
