{"id":6469,"date":"2026-08-21T10:08:26","date_gmt":"2026-08-21T08:08:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.commissie-meijers.nl\/?p=6469"},"modified":"2026-08-21T10:11:53","modified_gmt":"2026-08-21T08:11:53","slug":"rule-of-law-quarterly-update-july-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.commissie-meijers.nl\/nl\/rule-of-law-quarterly-update-july-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Rule of Law Quarterly Update July 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Policy update\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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  1. European Commission publishes annual\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>Rule of Law Report<\/em><\/strong><\/a>\u00a0<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    On 17th<\/sup> July, the European Commission published its seventh annual Rule of Law Report, looking at the justice system, anti-corruption, media freedom and checks and balances across all 27 member states plus the EU candidate countries. The Commission frames the picture as broadly positive, pointing to continued reforms on judicial independence, the rollout of the new EU anti-corruption directive, and the entry into force of the Media Freedom Act and Anti-SLAPP directive. But it acknowledges the pace of reform is uneven across Member States. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The report has faced criticism on several fronts. This year’s follow-up rate on last year’s recommendations was the lowest since the report began, leading some to ask whether the exercise is “losing its bite.”<\/a> Critics have also long pointed out that the report, as in previous years, contains no chapter assessing the EU institutions themselves, something civil society groups have been pushing for.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The European Federation of Journalists is a case in point. Ahead of publication, the EFJ had already joined 36 other organisations in warning the Report risks becoming a routine box-ticking formality<\/a> unless tied to real consequences, such as binding rule of law conditionality in the next EU budget. Once the report came out, the EFJ said it seriously underestimates<\/a> the decline in press freedom across the EU, pointing to monitoring data showing nearly 1,500 press freedom violations in 2025 and rising attacks on journalists, even as the Commission still calls the overall situation “broadly positive.” For now, though, the conditionality civil society is asking for doesn’t seem to be on the table: Commission Vice-President Henna Virkkunen has said there will be no automaticity between Rule of Law recommendations and access to EU funds. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    1. Repairing<\/em><\/strong><\/a>\u00a0the\u00a0rule\u00a0of\u00a0law\u00a0in Hungary<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      Since winning April’s election, Hungary’s new Prime Minister P\u00e9ter Magyar has made addressing Orb\u00e1n’s damage to the rule of law a top priority. Within days of the vote, he travelled to Brussels to discuss unlocking billions of euros in EU funds. His government has already scrapped the state of emergency Orb\u00e1n kept in place for years, and Magyar has pushed for the resignation of Orb\u00e1n-appointed officials, though so far without success. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Unfreezing the funds while genuinely respecting the rule of law is proving a difficult balance. Legal scholars have warned<\/a> it won’t be straightforward: the Hungarian presidency, top courts and prosecution service are still run by Orb\u00e1n appointees who could slow down or even block certain reforms, and several EU court cases are still pending that could limit how much room the Commission has to release the money. Two cases stand out: one brought by Polish judges’ associations (C-555\/24 P<\/a>) over the premature release of funds to Poland, and another brought by the European Parliament itself (C-225\/24<\/a>) over the Commission’s partial unfreezing of Poland’s funds under the Common Provisions Regulation. They also point to Poland as a warning sign, where funds were unfrozen quickly after the 2023 election, but reforms later stalled once a hostile president dug in, leaving Brussels with little leverage left. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The LGBTQ community is similarly aware of the challenges facing the new government. While rights advocates are cautiously optimistic<\/a> that anti-LGBTQ legislation introduced under Orb\u00e1n will eventually be repealed, they acknowledge that progress is likely to be slow and gradual. Despite a landmark Court of Justice of the European Union ruling finding Hungary’s anti-LGBTQ law incompatible with EU law, the government has yet to set out a timetable for reform, and campaigners expect political and institutional obstacles to slow the pace of change. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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      1. Pride events\u00a0facing\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>backlash<\/em><\/strong><\/a>\u00a0across\u00a0the\u00a0EU<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

        Across Europe, Pride events are increasingly facing threats of violence, as far-right mobilisation against LGBTQ visibility grows. Counter-marches have become much more common over the past couple of years within the EU, and as a result, Pride organisers now often need extensive security just to hold their events, with some marches scaled back or cancelled altogether over safety concerns. In Bautzen, eastern Germany, for instance, organisers were forced to cancel parts of the 2024 Pride celebrations after several hundred far-right counterprotesters marched under the slogan “against gender ideology and identity confusion”. According to Sabine Volk, these attacks are not isolated incidents but point to a wider shift in European politics, where anti-feminist and anti-LGBTQ rhetoric is being normalised through broad far-right coalitions. This growing need for security is itself a democratic problem, since it limits how safely marginalised groups can appear in public and take part in democratic life. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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        1. Rule\u00a0of\u00a0law\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>roadmap<\/em><\/strong><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0for\u00a0Ukraine\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

          Reforming Ukraine\u2019s prosecution system remains a key priority in strengthening the country\u2019s criminal justice framework and plays an important role in meeting its international commitments on the path towards European Union membership. On 17th<\/sup> July 2026, the Council of Europe, in cooperation with the EU Project Pravo-Justice, brought together Ukrainian authorities, international organisations, and civil society representatives to discuss the next steps in this reform process. The discussions focused on improving the organisation of the prosecution service, reforming the General Inspectorate, strengthening prosecutorial self-governance, and aligning Ukraine\u2019s prosecution system with European standards. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          1. Rule\u00a0of\u00a0law\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>concerns<\/em><\/strong><\/a>\u00a0regarding\u00a0Slovakia<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

            The European Parliament adopted a second rule-of-law resolution<\/a> on Slovakia in less than a month, warning the country could ultimately face suspension of EU funds. While an earlier resolution focused mainly on the management of EU money, this one broadened the criticism to the wider state of democracy, judicial independence, media freedom, NGOs and minority rights under Robert Fico’s government. The resolution passed with 347 votes in favour, with Slovak MEPs voting against or abstaining. It calls on the Commission to assess whether Slovakia poses a “clear risk of a serious breach” of EU values under Article 2 of the TEU and urged Brussels to use \u201call enforcement tools at its disposal\u201d, including the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism. This could eventually lead to frozen EU payments if concerns aren’t addressed. The resolution draws on two 2025 European Parliament monitoring missions to Slovakia, which found no meaningful improvement since their visits. LIBE committee chair Javier Zarzalejos called it a “final warning” to Bratislava, saying the EU “is not just a cash machine.” <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            CJEU Cases<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 16 July 2026, Case C-523\/24 <\/strong>Sociedad Civil Catalana, Asociaci\u00f3n C\u00edvica y Cultural (SCC) and Ministerio Fiscal v RAS and Others<\/em><\/strong> ECLI:EU:C:2026:588.<\/strong><\/a><\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The CJEU on Amnesty, Article 267 TFEU Standing,\u00a0and\u00a0the Limits of Article 19(1) TEU\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This judgment concerns the Spanish amnesty law connected with the 2017 independence referendum for the autonomous region of Catalonia. The Spanish law granted amnesty to individuals connected with the Catalan independence process, thereby removing criminal, administrative and civil liability without hearing all parties to the proceedings. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Before the Court was able to address the preliminary questions, it first had to address whether the Spanish Court of Auditors, which requested the preliminary ruling, is a court or tribunal, with the power to raise such questions. The defendants claimed that the court of auditors was not part of the judiciary, thus also not a court or tribunal in light of Article 267 TFEU. The Court recalled its long line of jurisprudence that the classification as such does not prevent it from being a court or tribunal for the sake of preliminary rulings as long as it exercises judicial functions and it is independent and impartial. In the present case, the Court found that the Court of Auditors fulfilled all of these requirements. The fact that the investigating officers are selected from among the Court of Auditors does not cause any problems, given the fact that these officials would then not be part of the judicial activities subsequently.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The first question referred to the Court concerned the Union\u2019s budget. Significant costs had been incurred in the circumstances surrounding the independence referendum. The amnesty law foresaw the extinction of criminal and civil liability, meaning that these costs would not be repaid to the government, leading to a shortfall in the national budget. The domestic court asked the CJEU whether the amnesty law is capable of affecting the financial interests of the Union. However, the Court, in this case, found the connection too remote, and an adverse effect on the financial interests of the Union could not be established on the sole basis of the reduction in gross national income. The funds were also not related to the Union budget nor intended for that budget, leading to the conclusion that Article 325 TFEU was not breached. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Next, the Court was called upon to examine whether the amnesty law is compatible with Article 19(1) TEU. Unlike Article 47 CFR, Article 19(1) TEU only concerns problems of a systemic nature capable of undermining the proper functioning of the national judicial system. Thereby, the national rules in question do not, in themselves, give rise to such systemic problems. This included closing the proceedings within two months, no examination of the defence’s submissions and evidence, and without hearing all of the parties. According to the Court, these are characteristics that are part of amnesty proceedings and do not undermine Article 19(1) TEU.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 16 July 2026, Case C-666\/24 <\/strong>Ministerio Fiscal and Others v EGB<\/em><\/strong> and Others ECLI:EU:C:2026:589<\/strong><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Amnesty laws compliance with the rule of law\u00a0in light of\u00a0the Counter-terrorism\u00a0directive,\u00a0and\u00a0principles of EU law.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This preliminary ruling also concerns the Spanish amnesty law (see above), answering a question referred by the National High Court on the Counter-terrorism directive (Directive (EU) 2017\/541), read in the light of the principles of primacy and sincere cooperation, legal certainty, equal treatment and non-discrimination. Twelve individuals were accused of acts constituting terrorist offences, in the context of the movement for Catalan independence.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The Court began by stating that in principle amnesty laws fall within the competences of the Member States insofar as they comply with EU law. Thereby, they followed the AG\u2019s line of argumentation that amnesty has not been harmonised at EU level. Further, the Court admitted that the Spanish amnesty law may result in acts falling within the scope of the Counter-terrorism directive being incapable of prosecution in Spain. However, according to the Court, there are sufficient safeguards to ensure the effective implementation of the Counter-terrorism directive, such as the exclusion from amnesty of individuals who caused serious breaches of human rights. The amnesty law is also adopted to reduce institutional and political tensions and would therefore not compromise the effectiveness of the Directive. The Court referred to the preamble of the Spanish amnesty law, which claims to protect legal certainty, respect for the principle of legality and a legal framework for the impartial protection of fundamental rights as well as equality before the law. Thereby, the Court found that in the context of amnesties pursuing a political reconciliation aim, none of the principles above had been breached. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This judgment, however, has received considerable analysis and criticism.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Parsa Tonkaboni<\/a>, for example, criticised the Court\u2019s refusal to test compliance with Article 2, which the Court has, through numerous judgments, found to be binding through the principle of non-regression and shared values among Member States. Thereby, it is irrelevant whether amnesties fall within national competences, a topic the Court repeatedly tackled. According to Tonkaboni, the Court used a flawed equality test, disregarding the principle that the objectives of the field to which the act relates must also be taken into account when applying the test. In particular, political motive acts as an aggravating factor in criminal law, and the Court\u2019s reasoning runs counter to the logic of the Counter-terrorism directive. Furthermore, it has been argued that the Court should not have accepted the political reconciliation objective of the amnesty law at face value, particularly as it was used as a tool of political negotiation. Importantly, the Court also refused to examine judicial independence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            N\u00faria Gonz\u00e1lez Campa\u00f1\u00e1<\/a> criticised that there was no genuine democratic debate, raising serious concerns that it could be classified as self-amnesty, something that raises concerns with the values in Article 2. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 16 July 2026, Case C-424\/24 <\/strong>ZD v Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC) and Others<\/em><\/strong> ECLI:EU:C:2026:602<\/strong><\/a><\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            How do\u00a0specialised\u00a0sports\u00a0courts fit within the system of judicial review?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This case concerns proceedings brought by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Italian Football Federation against a number of Italian football clubs in connection with financial crimes. The clubs’ directors were sanctioned under Italian sports law, with the sanctions subsequently extended to have worldwide effect. The applicants exhausted all available remedies before the sports courts, including appeal at the highest instance. Having done so, they brought proceedings before an administrative court. That court’s jurisdiction, however, is limited to awarding compensation and does not extend to annulling the sanctions themselves. Against this background, the administrative court referred a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, asking whether this system of judicial review is compatible with EU law. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The Court began by recalling the requirements of effective judicial protection, noting that Article 19(1) TEU applies to any body called upon to act as a court or tribunal. In this respect, Member States must ensure that such courts and tribunals are independent, impartial, and previously established by law, so as to guarantee effective judicial protection. The Court went on to hold that Article 19(1) TEU does not require a second level of jurisdiction, provided that the first one (in this instance the sports courts) satisfies the requirements of a court or tribunal, including the power to annul decisions and to grant interim relief. In this particular case, it is for the referring court to determine whether these sports courts fulfil these requirements.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This judgment builds upon a number of recent cases on the role of sports in society, and whether they deserve different treatment than other organisations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 16 July 2026, Case C-158\/25 <\/strong>QJ v Administration de l’enregistrement, des domaines et de la TVA and \u00c9tat du Grand-duch\u00e9 de Luxembourg<\/em><\/strong> ECLI:EU:C:2026:591.<\/strong><\/a> <\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            To what extent\u00a0can a company director be held liable for the actions of their company\u00a0in light of\u00a0Article 47\u00a0CFR?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This case concerns a company director who, under Luxemburgish law, was held jointly liable to pay VAT that the company owed. The applicant attempted to challenge the penalty but was unable to do so as they fell outside the time within which the VAT bill could be challenged, despite the fact that no notice had ever been addressed to the director personally. The question then arose of whether this is compatible with Article 47 of the Charter.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The Court recalled that Article 47 CFR requires access to a court which can consider all the issues of fact and of law that are relevant for resolving the case before it. This may be restricted only insofar as a person is not deprived of the possibility to challenge legal classifications to which they are subject. In this case, the applicant was not able to challenge any of the factual or legal findings (thereby violating the essence of the right) nor any violation of their fundamental rights. The Court drew a clear distinction between an individual\u2019s right to a remedy and the separate question of the company’s liability for the tax debt, underlining that the protection of fundamental rights cannot be sacrificed for reasons of administrative convenience.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 16 July 2026, Case C-748\/23 <\/strong>C. Limited v MS<\/em><\/strong> ECLI:EU:C:2026:594<\/strong><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Can a\u00a0judge’s\u00a0appointment\u00a0circumstances\u00a0alone\u00a0establish\u00a0a\u00a0breach of the\u00a0right to an\u00a0independent\u00a0tribunal\u00a0under Article 19(1) TEU?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This judgment concerns Polish rules allowing litigants before the Polish Supreme Court to request a test of a judge’s independence and impartiality, in the context of a cross-border dispute where the underlying Polish judgment’s enforceability was already being contested in Ireland on rule of law grounds. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The first question referred to the Court concerned whether the circumstances surrounding a judge’s appointment can, by themselves, establish a breach of the right to an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Thereby, the Court recalled that an irregularity in the appointment process breaches this requirement where it is of such a nature and gravity that it creates a real risk of undue discretion by another branch of power, thereby casting reasonable doubt on the judge’s independence in the minds of litigants. In those cases, a party cannot be required to provide further evidence to substantiate the alleged breach. By answering this question, the Court found that the mere existence of serious deficiencies in the appointment process is sufficient to establish a breach of the right to an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Next, the Court examined whether a panel reviewing a judge’s independence and impartiality can itself include judges appointed under conditions identical to those being scrutinised. The Court held that judges cannot rule on a colleague’s recusal where they themselves would be exposed to the same recusal request. Consequently, judges appointed via the same contested procedure as the judge under review cannot sit on the panel examining that judge, as their presence would itself generate legitimate doubts as to the panel’s neutrality. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Finally, the Court addressed the consequences flowing from the primacy of Union law. Article 19(1) TEU, read with Article 47 CFR, has direct effect and imposes an unconditional obligation of result. Where a reviewing panel is itself irregularly composed because it includes judges lacking the requisite impartiality, the national court must disapply the domestic rules governing that panel’s composition, without waiting for legislative reform, so that the request is heard by a properly constituted panel.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Order of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 2 July 2026, Case C-446\/26<\/strong> PPU  RI v Openbaar Ministerie<\/em><\/strong> ECLI:EU:C:2026:551.<\/strong><\/a><\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Can a\u00a0prosecutor’s EAW\u00a0bypass\u00a0judicial\u00a0review?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            In this case, a Greek prosecutor had issued two European Arrest Warrants for the applicant. The judicial review underlying one of the arrest warrants, however, was questioned, as it was issued by the public prosecutor without a court having assessed its proportionality. Thus, the Dutch court, under an accelerated procedure, sought clarification on the enforceability of this arrest warrant.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The Court began by reiterating that in the enforcement of an EAW, fundamental rights are examined at two stages, first when the issuing state comes to the conclusion that action must be taken (such as a national arrest warrant) and again when issuing the EAW. Fundamental rights must be reviewed by a court at a minimum of one of these stages. Where a court is not the issuer of the EAW, that decision must nonetheless be able to be appealed for judicial review.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Where there is a possibility to challenge the EAW after the surrender, the requirements of Article 47 CFR are fulfilled, as long as the initial national arrest warrant has been issued by a court. Thus, an EAW may only be refused where the executing state finds that there is no effective judicial protection at the initial arrest warrant, nor at the EAW. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 30 April 2026, Case C-30\/25 <\/strong>Criminal proceedings against FR<\/em><\/strong> ECLI:EU:C:2026:359<\/strong><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            How can functional immunity of\u00a0an\u00a0EESC member be reconciled with the rule of law?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This judgment concerns a criminal investigation by OLAF into FR, a member of the European Economic and Social Committee. FR\u2019s immunity was waived for the investigation into his alleged criminal conduct. However, in 2020, FR was nominated for a new 5-year term at the EESC. Over the duration of this term, FR was called to appear before a Belgian court for his alleged criminal acts. The question that arose in these proceedings, and which was then subsequently referred to the Court, concerned his immunity, and whether it extended to this new term. In 2019, it was already found that in order to hold an elected MEP in pre-trial detention where the acts were committed before the election, a waiver of immunity must be requested (Junqueras Vies<\/em> (C\u2011502\/19)). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The Court reasoned that it is a matter for the EESC to decide on the waiver of immunity, solely taking into consideration the interests of the Union, and not the personal interest of its members. According to the Court, a decision to waive immunity is then taken in order to ensure the effectiveness of criminal proceedings. Furthermore, this situation is also not comparable to the previous case of Junqueras Vies<\/em> due to the structural and functional differences between the two institutions. Upon this basis, the Court, in few words, came to the conclusion that the prior waiver of immunity is still valid even if the member under investigation was nominated for a new term, as long as the subject matter of the investigation is not extended. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            ECtHR<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Yasak v. T\u00fcrkiye <\/em><\/strong>5\/5\/2026 (Application no. 17389\/20) (Grand Chamber)<\/strong><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            What is the relationship between counterterrorism\u00a0and\u00a0the rule of law?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This case concerns an individual who was accused of being part of the FET\u00d6\/PDY which, under Turkish law, was deemed a terrorist organization that participated in the 2016 coup d\u2019\u00e9tat. The public prosecutor relied on statements by witnesses who got offered the possibility of a reduction in sentence in exchange for information, telephone records, money deposited in the applicant\u2019s account, and employment at an organization affiliated with the terrorist organization. The applicant was then sentenced to seven years and six months\u2019 imprisonment, in a prison where he was forced to sleep on a mattress on the floor, where the number of detainees exceeded the standard capacity, where his personal space varied between 3.6 and 4.6 sq.m, permanently exposed to artificial light and a noisy atmosphere, and where the applicant lacked privacy. After exhausting domestic remedies, he brought a case under Articles 3 and 7 ECHR, alleging a violation of the principle of no punishment without law as well as the prohibition of torture. This case came after an unsuccessful challenge at first instance before the Chamber, before being referred to the Grand Chamber. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            In regard to Article 7, the Chamber judgment found there to be a legal basis at the time of his conviction. The Grand Chamber, however, honed in on the mens rea (intent) <\/em>assessment, and analysed whether the applicant willingly and knowingly joined an organisation with such objectives and violent methods. Thereby, the domestic courts did not diligently analyse when the applicant was part of the organisation, and at what point the organisation turned violent. In any event, the applicant left two years before the coup d\u2019\u00e9tat. The ECtHR also criticized the domestic courts for failing to take account of how entrenched the organisation was in Turkish society, and that being part of the educational structure does not equate to being aware of the organisation\u2019s true objectives. The Court also highlighted the importance of an individualised assessment and criticised the domestic courts for merely looking at the development of the whole organisation without analysing the role of the applicant within. All of this together led to the conclusion that the applicant\u2019s Article 7 ECHR right was violated. The rule of law, in this case, becomes particularly apparent as the Court reiterates the importance of an individual review of a person\u2019s knowledge in being part of an organisation. Even where such an organisation may be categorised as terrorist, the individual’s own culpable state of mind, at the relevant time, must be established. Furthermore, it reiterates the principle that one may not be held guilty by association, even for the gravest crimes.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The Court also went on to examine whether there had been a breach of the prohibition of torture. The Court examined the conditions of the prison in which the applicant was held, with particular attention to the overcrowding, the allegation that the applicant was forced to sleep on a mattress on the floor, and the sanitary conditions, in light of the fact that these conditions lasted for approximately four years. The Court therefore came to the conclusion that Article 3 ECHR was also breached.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Taleski and Others v. North Macedonia <\/em><\/strong>23\/6\/2026 (Applications nos. 34261\/23 and 7877\/24) (Second Section)<\/strong><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            How\u00a0does the ECtHR\u00a0strike a balance\u00a0between\u00a0legal certainty,\u00a0accountability,\u00a0and\u00a0equality before the law?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This case concerns three high ranking North Macedonian public officials who, in 2016, were all issued pardons from criminal prosecution, which was at the time a very controversial matter. Judge M.L.T. (who would later be appointed to the Supreme Court) publicly condemned these pardons as effectively providing amnesty and urged the Constitutional Court to rule on this matter. An act was subsequently adopted that would deem the pardons null and void, while one of the applicants had already requested to remove his pardon, stating that he wished to prove his innocence, and three weeks later attempted to rely on the pardon again to avoid an investigation. The applicants then brought a case to the ECtHR, alleging that their right to a fair trial was breached.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            First, in regard to the annulment of the pardons, the Court found no violation of Article 6 relying on the rule of law. The Court endeavoured on a balancing between legal certainty on one hand and equality before the law and accountability on the other. The Court also noted that the annulment of the pardons had the intention of restoring the rule of law and was done after extensive analysis by the Supreme Court. Adopting a holistic view of the entire situation at hand, and the importance of accountability of public officials in ensuring the rule of law, the Court found that the annulment was justified on compelling grounds of general interest. This judgment illustrates well how the Court balances competing aspects of the rule of law. This case also engaged with the principle laid down in Grz\u0119da v. Poland<\/em> on laws targeting specific individuals, and its relevance to whether the annulment of the pardons here was compatible with the rule of law. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Second, the applicants complained about a violation of their right to an independent and impartial tribunal as Judge M.L.T. who had previously made public statements on the situation, was a member of the Supreme Court in that case. However, because the applicants did not raise this point prior to lodging a complaint in front of the ECtHR, they did not exhaust all domestic remedies. This is regardless of the fact that there has never been a successful dismissal of a judge at the North Macedonian Supreme Court and the applicants were only aware of the Judge M.L.T.\u2019s participation after the final judgement had been delivered. The Court found that the applicants never gave the domestic authorities an opportunity to put matters right.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The third complaint was about the right to adversarial trials. Here, two of the applicants argued that they had not been served with a copy of the prosecutor’s submissions prior to the appeal court hearing. The domestic court did not adequately remedy that failure to ensure access to documents, and therefore the ECtHR found a breach of Article 6(1) ECHR for the third complaint.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Sobczy\u0144ska and Others v. Poland<\/em><\/strong> 21\/5\/2026 (Applications nos. 62765\/14 and 2 others) (First Section)<\/strong><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            How should judges be appointed to uphold the rule of law\u00a0and\u00a0avoid arbitrariness?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This case concerns three junior Polish judges, who were all ordinarily elected to the District Court. However, the Polish President refused to appoint these judges without stating any reason. It was the first time that a President had declined to appoint candidates that were duly elected by the general assembly of the respective courts and had received a green light from the National Council for the Judiciary. The applicants then lodged a complaint in front of the ECtHR claiming a violation of access to a court and effective remedy.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            On admissibility, the first step was to assess the existence of a right. In that regard, the applicants claimed that they had not been granted equal access to public service, that they had not been afforded a fair procedure in the assessment of their applications, and that there were no guarantees in place to prevent arbitrariness. Next, the Court, in few words, found it to be a genuine and serious dispute, before moving to the civil nature of the claim, for which the Eskelinen <\/em>test was applied. Third, the ECtHR was undecided whether access to a court was expressly excluded, but since there were no objective grounds in the State\u2019s interest, these were civil proceedings subject to Article 6(1) ECHR. Here, the Court, drawing on its long line of case law, reiterated the importance of protecting the judiciary and ensuring its impartiality. The ECtHR also did not accept the argument brought forward by the Polish government that this was necessary for the institutional balance.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            On the merits, the Court began by recalling Grz\u0119da<\/em> <\/em>and that where there is no access to an independent and impartial court, the question of compliance with the rule of law will always arise. The Polish government did not bring forward any new arguments on the absence of judicial review. The Court then stated that the applicants had a legitimate and reasonable expectation that their application would be assessed transparently, objectively, and without arbitrariness. Particularly for the appointment of judges, there must be weighty reasons exceptionally justifying the absence of any judicial review.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This case built on several cases on the Polish judiciary and, once again, highlights the importance of preventing arbitrary decision making. Unlike the previous cases, this case adds that this protection also extends to the appointment of junior judges, who previously were not full judges. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Grande Oriente d\u2019Italia v. Italy<\/em><\/strong> 28\/4\/2025 (Application no. 29550\/17) (First Section)<\/strong><\/a> <\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            How far does parliamentary autonomy extend?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The applicant was an Italian Masonic association under investigation by a parliamentary anti-mafia commission. The applicant was repeatedly requested to provide general information on its members, and specific identities of certain members and their lodges, which he refused to provide in the absence of specific reasons for the request and the absence of any crime. The applicant was also summoned as a witness and examined in public, where he again refused to provide specific information on its members. He also made an appeal to the Italian data protection authority which claimed to lack jurisdiction when it comes to these parliamentary proceedings. The commission then ordered a search of the applicant\u2019s office, which was unsuccessfully challenged before the parliamentary commission and before the public prosecutor whom it requested to apply to the Constitutional Court. After all of the information had been gathered, the documents and electronic equipment were eventually returned to the applicant. The applicant then lodged a complaint under Articles 8, 11, and 13 ECHR. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            First, in regard to admissibility, the Government claimed that the applicant had an opportunity to appeal to the commission but did not make use of it. The Court found that the applicant attempted to make use of this remedy but was not successful due to the nature and characteristics of the procedure. The Court also found that criminal or civil proceedings were not suitable for the case, nor a ruling by the Constitutional Court.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            In regard to the merits, after finding an interference, legal basis, and legitimate aim, the Court went on to assess whether it was necessary in a democratic society. To that end, the Venice commission highlighted the importance of the rule of law, and that the parliamentary commission did not exist in a legal vacuum. The Court agreed with that and stated that parliamentary autonomy can be expressed through the organisation of fact-finding missions or the preparation of proposals, but where the coercive procedural acts are undertaken, the margin of appreciation is much smaller, and sufficient safeguards must be installed. The Court reiterated that the rule of law requires legal protection against arbitrary interference by public authorities. The order in the present case was very broad, and insufficient safeguards were in place to protect the applicant. It is also interesting that the Court decided to discuss this argument in the proportionality assessment, instead of the legal basis. The Court then went on and discussed the safeguards and accepted that the safeguards may differ in each circumstance, as long as they are sufficient. In the present case, the order only prescribed how the search was to take place, but did not provide any ex-ante safeguards, nor effective judicial review. Because of that, the Court found a breach of his right to private life.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This case, at length, discusses how parliamentary autonomy can fit within the rule of law. While it is an important aspect of separation of powers, it cannot operate in a legal vacuum. To that end, individuals must still be given sufficient opportunities to protect their fundamental rights, and parliamentary autonomy cannot be used to grant immunity.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Konstantinou v. Cyprus <\/em><\/strong>7\/5\/2026 (Application no. 36862\/23) (Fifth Section)<\/strong><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            What procedural safeguards should exist in the appointment\/promotion of a judge?\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This case concerns a senior district court judge who applied for a position as District Court president, where he was ranked first in order of seniority. Nonetheless, no members of the Supreme Council of Judicature (SCJ) voted for the applicant or proposed him for the position. The applicant then requested records of the procedure, but instead was told that they relied on opinions of the administrative presidents and the CV on the candidates. They also referred to his performance in the interviews, and claimed that there was no significant difference in the years of service of the candidates. This all happened in a transitional period of judicial reforms. The applicant first challenged the decision before the Administrative Court, which threw out his case as premature given the judicial reforms. He subsequently complained to the Supreme Constitutional Court who dismissed the claim on lack of jurisdiction, claiming that, because of the judicial reforms, that court could not hear cases from the SCJ that made the decision on the candidates. He then lodged a complaint in front of the ECtHR regarding Article 6(1) ECHR specifically, as regards access to a court and the impartiality of the SCC. Interestingly, the applicant was later elected to the position. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            On admissibility, the Court examined the context of the judicial reforms, and due to the novel situation provided some leeway for the applicant to follow the precise procedure in front of the national courts. Next, they found that the applicant had a right to a lawful and fair procedure, to which there was a genuine and serious dispute, before applying the Eskelinen test. First, because the administrative court and SCC both had differing interpretations on how the applicant could appeal the decision, the applicant could not have been excluded from applying to a court, and there was no objective justification for not hearing his case.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            On the merits, the ECtHR recalled that exclusions from access to court must remain exceptional and be supported by weighty reasons. Relying on Greco and Venice commission reports, the Court examined whether this exclusion was compatible with the rule of law. To that end, considerations of administrative efficiency and expediency do not remedy the detrimental effect on the rule of law, neither does the fact that Cyprus was undergoing judicial reform at that period. Therefore, the essence of the right to a fair trial was violated.  <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

            Policy update\u00a0 On 17th July, the European Commission published its seventh annual Rule of Law Report, looking at the justice system, anti-corruption, media freedom and checks and balances across all 27 member states plus the EU candidate countries. The Commission frames the picture as broadly positive, pointing to continued reforms on judicial independence, the rollout of the new EU anti-corruption […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[54,57,18],"tags":[113,112,79,82,106,88],"class_list":["post-6469","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-eu-update","category-rule-of-law-update","category-uncategorized","tag-cjeu","tag-ecthr","tag-eu","tag-policy-update","tag-rule-of-law-3","tag-rule-of-law-update"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.commissie-meijers.nl\/nl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6469","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.commissie-meijers.nl\/nl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.commissie-meijers.nl\/nl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.commissie-meijers.nl\/nl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.commissie-meijers.nl\/nl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6469"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.commissie-meijers.nl\/nl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6469\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6470,"href":"https:\/\/www.commissie-meijers.nl\/nl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6469\/revisions\/6470"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.commissie-meijers.nl\/nl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6469"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.commissie-meijers.nl\/nl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6469"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.commissie-meijers.nl\/nl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6469"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}